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Understanding	pension	obligation	figures	(though
your	boss	might	not	want	you	to)
Traditionally	the	preserve	of	boring	articles	in	arcane	journals,	employers’	pension	obligation
accounts	have	recently	featured	in	headline	stories	in	mainstream	media.	Geoff	Meeks	explains
the	role	of	these	accounts	in	an	insidious	redistribution	of	risk	and	wealth	between	employers	and
employees.
When	the	academics’	pension	fund	–	the	Universities	Superannuation	Scheme	–	reported	it	had	a
gap	of	£17.5billion	in	its	pension	fund	in	July	2017,	fears	were	raised	that	student	fees	would	have	to	go	up	yet
again,	or	that	university	teaching	and	research	would	suffer,	that	some	universities	might	go	bust,	or	that	retired
academics	would	be	impoverished	(full	disclosure:	I’m	a	member	of	the	scheme).	Then,	when	the	owners	of	the
UK’s	last	major	steelworks,	Port	Talbot,	reviewed	its	future,	the	pensions	gap	was	the	stumbling	block.	The
employer	would	only	keep	the	plant	alive	if	employees	gave	up	some	of	their	pension	rights.
And	it	was	the	pensions	gap	left	in	his	former	company,	BHS,	that	led	the	media	and	Parliament	to	shred	the
reputation	of	the	celebrity	retail	tycoon,	Sir	Philip	Green.	What	much	of	the	excited	media	comment	has	generally
not	explained	is,	first,	that	the	numbers	published	on	these	pension	gaps	are	very	“soft”	–	subject	to	erratic,
violent	change	from	year	to	year;	and,	second,	that	employers	are	often	exploiting	the	volatile	numbers	as	cover
to	shift	risk	from	shareholders	to	employees,	and	wealth	from	employees	to	shareholders.
The	pensions	gap,	or	net	obligation,	is	the	difference	between	–	on	the	one	hand	–	the	estimated	cost	of
honouring	existing	pension	promises,	the	pension	liability,	and	–	on	the	other	–	the	assets	which	the	employer
has	built	up	(generally	with	a	mix	of	employer	and	employee	contributions)	to	meet	those	liabilities.	It	arises	only
with	defined	benefit	pension	schemes,	where	an	employer	has	promised	a	certain	pension	–	say	half	the
employee’s	final	salary.
The	challenge	faced	by	accountants	in	quantifying	this	gap	at	a	particular	moment	is	that	the	pension	contract
between	the	employer	and	employee	can	last	60	years	or	more	(from	hiring	to	death).		And	estimating	the
position	at	some	point	partway	through	that	contract	–	as	annual	accounts	require	–	is	hazardous.	This	is
particularly	so	because	measures	of	both	the	pension	liability	and	the	asset	are	subject	to	wild	swings	–	the
former	because	it	depends	on	numbers	from	markets	which	are	manipulated	from	time	by	time	by	government
(spectacularly	so	in	the	last	few	years);	and	the	latter	because	it	depends	on	numbers	from	markets	which
alternate	between	excessive	optimism	and	excessive	pessimism.
To	calculate	the	liability	you	have	first	to	come	up	with	figures	such	as	the	future	salary	(final	or	average)	on
which	the	pension	will	be	based,	and	how	long	the	employee	will	draw	the	pension	until	he	or	she	dies.	But	then,
and	this	is	crucial	in	interpreting	pension	gaps	reported	in	recent	years,	in	comparing	this	liability	with	the	asset	–
the	accumulated	pension	funds	–	you	need	to	discount	those	future	liabilities,	to	translate	a	future	payment	into	a
present	liability.	Put	differently,	you	could	think	of	the	discounting	as	asking	how	much	money	you	would	need	to
have	invested	now	at	prospective	interest	rates	in	order	to	meet	a	pension	payment	in	the	future	–	in	an	extreme
case,	60	years	later.
The	accounting	authorities	decree	(in	International	Accounting	Standards)	the	interest	rate	that	employers	have	to
use	in	this	calculation	–	otherwise	the	employers	might	be	tempted	to	choose	one	which	flattered	their	accounts.
This	is	currently	the	prevailing	rate	in	the	AA	corporate	bond	market.	With	a	horizon	of	up	to	60	years,	the
discount	rate	has	a	massive	impact	on	the	present	value	of	the	liability.	To	illustrate,	the	accounts	of	the	telecom
business	BT	reported	this	rate	(inflation-adjusted)	as	3.84%	in	2009,	but	1.83%	in	2010.	To	pay	£10,000	to	a
pensioner	60	years	later,	you	would	have	needed	£1,043	with	the	2009	interest	rate,	but	£3,369	just	a	year	later
when	the	prescribed	rate	had	roughly	halved.	BT	has	one	of	the	biggest	corporate	defined	benefit	pension	funds.
And	this	discount	rate	change,	combined	with	other	developments	over	the	year,	led	to	its	reported	pension
liability	rising	from	£33bn	in	2009	to	£43bn	in	2010.
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Why	did	the	discount	rate	change	so	sharply	at	this	time?	The	authorities	in	the	UK,	the	US,	and	elsewhere
deployed	monetary	policy	to	drive	down	interest	rates	in	an	attempt	to	stimulate	the	economy	in	the	wake	of	the
financial	crisis.	This	was	intended	as	a	temporary,	crisis	measure;	and	although	it	has	lasted	longer	than
expected,	current	debate	is	about	when,	not	whether,	interest	rates	will	rise.	If	the	interest	rate	rises,	the	pension
liabilities	will	shrink.	But	we	can’t	know	for	sure	whether,	when,	or	by	how	much	interest	rates	will	rise.
What	of	the	assets	held	in	the	pension	fund	to	meet	those	future	liabilities?	These	are	recorded	in	the	employer’s
accounts	at	current	market	value.	For	the	financial	assets	typically	held	in	pension	fund	portfolios	these	market
values	are	notoriously	volatile.	Drawing	on	Keynes’	famous	analysis	of	speculative	financial	markets,	Nobel
Laureate	Robert	Shiller	has	explored	the	movements	of	one	component	of	those	portfolios,	company	shares.	He
supplies	a	wealth	of	evidence	supporting	his	argument	that	fluctuations	in	the	market	prices	of	these	shares	are
much	greater	than	is	warranted	by	the	variation	in	subsequent	real	returns	which	they	are	expected	to	reflect	–
and	which	will	be	available	to	fulfil	pension	promises.
To	illustrate	the	volatility,	the	average	stock	market	value	of	the	biggest	companies	on	the	London	Stock
Exchange	(FTSE	100)	fell	by	38%	in	just	10	months	from	December	2007,	only	to	rise	by	38%	in	the	next	18
months.	More	recently	it	fell	by	11%	in	the	year	to	April	2016,	then	rose	by	16%	in	the	year	following.
In	calmer	times,	the	prices	of	financial	assets	tend	to	rise	when	interest	rates	fall.	So	in	the	pensions	case,	asset
price	rises	might,	to	some	extent,	compensate	for	liability	increases	caused	by	the	interest	rate	fall.	But,	for
example,	at	times	of	crisis,	when	share	prices	have	fallen	sharply	and	the	authorities	artificially	depress	interest
rates	in	the	hope	of	bolstering	confidence,	pension	fund	assets	shrink	just	when	their	liabilities	are	recorded	as
increasing.
So	have	the	accounting	standard-setters	imposed	the	wrong	measurement	system?	It	was	introduced	with	good
reason	–	to	replace	previous	opaque	smoothing	schemes	which	concealed	big	unfunded	pension	liabilities.	The
aim	was	to	“tell	it	like	it	is”		in	the	light	of	today’s	market	prices	for	the	discount	rate	and	for	the	assets	held	in	the
fund.	But	this	approach,	and	any	other	accounting	model,	struggles	to	cope	with	reporting	on	the	progress	of	a
transaction	which	will	not	be	complete	for	60	years	or	more,	where	the	outcome	will	depend	on	prices	in	the
meantime,	and	those	prices	are	not	generated	by	free,	orderly,	stable	markets.
The	numbers	which	are	published	on	current	rules	could	perhaps	best	be	seen	as	a	heavily	qualified	“what	if?”
estimate:	what	would	the	pensions	gap	be	if	current	prices	persisted?	But	history	tells	us	that	they	won’t	persist,
even	for	one	year,	let	alone	for	60.	And	so	the	error	margin	in	the	estimate	is	vastly	bigger	than	for	most	other
numbers	in	the	employers’	accounts.
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Sophisticated	employers	surely	understand	this.	But	they	often	find	it	convenient	to	behave	as	if	they	don’t.	In	the
1990’s	employers	behaved	as	if	the	bull	market	would	continue	forever.	When	the	prices	of	assets	such	as
equities	held	in	the	pension	fund	rose,	they	declared	“holidays”	from	contributing	to	their	pension	funds	.	It	has
been	estimated	that	these	holidays	added	some	18	billion	pounds	to	profits.	But	when	the	markets	turned	(as
they	always	do)	pension	fund	assets	fell	by	a	quarter.
In	the	next	stock	market	boom,	BP	declared	a	holiday	from	contributions	to	its	UK	pension	fund.	It	reduced	its
contribution	in	2008	from	$524m	to	$6m.	But	later	in	2008,	the	financial	markets	turned	again,	and	the	respective
pension	fund	assets	declined	from	$32billion	to	$18billion,	wiping	out	any	rationale	for	the	holiday.
When	the	pendulum	has	swung,	and	volatile	prices	have	worked	to	show	a	big	shortfall	in	the	pension	fund,
employers	have	seized	on	the	numbers	to	justify	decisions	to	abandon	or	dilute	defined	benefit	schemes.	Such
schemes	have	in	recent	years	been	frozen	by	most	employers:	new	employees	have	been	excluded,	and	(often)
existing	members	of	schemes	have	been	prevented	from	accumulating	further	pension	benefits	within	a	defined
benefit	scheme.
Employers	have	instead	moved	to	defined	contribution	schemes,	where	payments	are	made	into	an	employee’s
pension	pot,	and	the	employee	is	left	to	make	the	best	of	whatever	pension	income	that	pot	will	buy	on
retirement.	The	employer’s	pension	guarantee	which	was	embedded	in	the	defined	benefit	scheme	is	eliminated
–	the	new	arrangements	shift	risk	from	shareholders	to	employees.	And	in	practice	the	new	defined	contribution
schemes	are	much	less	generous	to	employees.	Paul	Lewis	in	the	FT	estimates	the	typical	employer’s
contribution	to	a	defined	benefit	scheme	as	around	15%	of	salary,	but	less	than	7%	in	the	average	defined
contribution	scheme.
So	when	measures	of	the	pension	fund	finances	have	been	temporarily	over-optimistic,	employers	have	taken	the
gain.	And	when	they	have	been	temporarily	over-pessimistic,	employees	have	taken	the	pain.	The	resulting	long-
term,	insidious	erosion	of	future	benefits	by	employers	may	turn	out	to	be	more	damaging	to	younger	generations
than	the	more	immediate	challenges	they	face	from	daunting	housing	markets	and	the	9%	graduate	tax	many	will
pay	into	middle	age.
________
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